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Assessing Mood Change With Visual Analogue Scales: Composite
Versus Vectorial Approaches
Stéphane Vautier and Mohammad H. Afzali
University of Toulouse
We examined the assessment of mood change using multiple visual analogue scales from the
perspectives of computing a composite difference score and verifying the vectorial compara-
bility of test and retest ratings. The composite approach raises the question of whether the
true score can measure mood and whether valid conclusions can be derived from true-score
differences within individual data. The vectorial approach allows clinicians to use the data
to test the causal and functional conception of ordinal measurability of patients’ mood. This
falsificationist approach may lead clinicians to recognize that, in some cases, ratings are not
measurements and should be treated as speech acts in a conversational setting.
A psychologist wants to monitor a patient’s mood by collect-
ing her/his self-ratings on a series of visual analogue scales
(VASs; Freyd, 1923; Zealley & Aitken, 1969). But what
should be done with these self-ratings? Everything depends
on how they are thought to measure patients’ mood. Clas-
sical Test Theory (CTT) recommends computing a compos-
ite score, based on the rationale that summing the observed
scores asymptotically reduces measurement error (if there
were an infinite series of experimentally independent scores,
their mean would be the true score). We begin by describing
the conceptual and epistemological issues raised by what we
call the composite approach. We then describe an alternative
approach that consists in viewing vectors of self-ratings as
outputs of a multivariate measurement function – the vec-
torial approach. We conclude that psychologists should be
ready to use self-ratings not as measurements but as speech
acts, when faced with falsifying evidence.
Let us start by taking a concrete example of a set of six
VASs designed to operationalize tense arousal. Patients were
instructed to rate their mood on a 102-mm straight line where
the end anchors were the extremes of a given feeling (VAS 1:
tense; VAS 2: strained; VAS 3: stressed; VAS 4: unstrained;
VAS 5: mellow; VAS 6: relaxed; Vautier, 2011). Respondent
1 rated his mood twice, marking the lines to indicate the in-
tensity of his internal stimuli (observed scores plotted in Fig.
1).
The Composite Approach
A curious structural feature of Vautier’s (2011) tense
arousal test-retest data is imperfect dynamic bipolarity (for
previous developments of this concept, see Vautier & Pohl,
2009; Vautier, Steyer, Jmel, & Raufaste, 2005): the mod-
Address for correspondence: Stéphane Vautier, OCTO-
GONE, Maison de la Recherche, Université Toulouse-2, 5 al-
lées A. Machado,. 31058 Toulouse Cedex 9, France. E-mail:
vautier@univ-tlse2.fr
24
50
58
54
71
78
66
34
60
70
62 62
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
Tense Strained Stressed Unstrained Mellow Relaxed
D
i s
t a
n
c e
 
f r o
m
 
t h
e  
O
r i g
i n
 
( m
m
)
Visual Analogue Scale
Time 1
Time 2
Figure 1. Self-ratings of Respondent 1.
elling of the difference scores revealed that the correlation
between the true-score differences measured by the negative
VASs (i.e., tense, strained, and stressed) and the reversed
true-score differences measured by the positive VASs (i.e.,
unstrained, mellow, and relaxed; see Vautier, 2011, Fig. 1,
right panel) was .82 (.03). Consequently, the negative and
positive VASs seemingly measured intraindividual variations
of distinct kinds, suggesting either that tense arousal is not a
single dimension of mood, or, if we argue that tense arousal
is a single dimension of mood, that the positive VASs lacked
construct validity with respect to the negative VASs. In either
event, psychologists would be well advised to compute two
difference scores, one from the negative VASs:
[(66 + 34 + 60) − (24 + 50 + 58)]/3 ' 9.3 mm, (1)
and one from the positive VASs:
[(70 + 62 + 62) − (54 + 71 + 78)]/3 = −3 mm. (2)
But what conclusion could be drawn from these differ-
ence scores? Vautier’s (2011) structural equation modelling
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(SEM) analyses indicated that the composite difference vari-
ables were quite reliable (Cronbach’s alpha: .95 and .94,
respectively). However, as the error components were un-
known, all psychologists could do in this case would be to
use the observed difference scores as better estimates of the
respective true-score differences. Thus, they could say that
it seems that tense arousal is slightly increased – +9.3 mm
–, but they would still have to decide how to interpret the
second difference score – −3 mm. Then again, were they
to consider the maximum composite variation (less than 10
mm) with respect to the VASsŠ total range (102 mm), they
could argue that as they had no evidence that Respondent 1’s
mood changed markedly, his mood change must have been
negligible.
A Conceptual Issue: Are True Scores Measurements of
Tense Arousal?. Unfortunately, the psychometric rhetoric
above is akin to obscurantism (for a broad criticism of aca-
demic obscurantism, see Elster, 2011; Notturno, 2000, 2009;
in the field of psychometrics, see Michell, 1997, 2000, 2006,
2008, 2009). The true score does not refer to an amount of
tense arousal that the observed score measures more or less
reliably (hoping that the measurement error is small). Ac-
cording to Lord and Novick (1968), the true score is the ex-
pectation of a counterfactual random variable that takes its
values from an empirical set of numerical values. In the VAS
context, the test score is the distance between the mark on the
straight line and its origin. Thus, the true score is the concept
of an expected distance measured in millimetres. CTT does
not assert that this expected distance measures an amount
of tense arousal because it is a statistical theory that can be
applied to marks on VASs.
Tense arousal cannot be observed, and the expected dis-
tance is also impossible to observe, so psychologists inter-
ested in the subject can easily use the term true score to refer
to an amount of tense arousal. It is not, however, valid to
deduce that two things sharing the same feature – non ob-
servability – are one and the same thing.
Conceptual confusion is also maintained by the pervasive
use of the term measurement error in the specialist litera-
ture. In CTT, this term denotes the difference between the
observed score and the expected score, while in assessment
literature, it suggests that the observed score results from a
measurement process, that is, from a process that relates an
amount of something (that cannot be observed) to an observ-
able event like a mark on a VAS, such that the observed event
is a causal effect of that amount. After all, if no measure-
ment process occurs, why name the difference between the
observed score and the true score a measurement error? Al-
though psychologists understandably wish to measure tense
arousal rather than mere distances on straight lines, CTT tells
us nothing about how observed or expected marks on VASs
actually measure tense arousal.
An Epistemological Issue: Invalid Conclusions From Ob-
servations. Structural properties can be tested statistically
through SEM. Vautier (2011) looked at whether the three
VASs of the same sign (i.e., all negative or all positive) mea-
sured the same expected score differences. This property is
not derived from the tautological CTT decomposition.
For example, coming back to Respondent 1’s scores, this
hypothesis states that the true-score differences associated
with the observed differences 66 − 24 = 42 mm (tense),
34−50 = −16 mm (strained), and 60−58 = 2 mm (stressed)
are one and the same expected value δn. Accordingly, it as-
sumes that 9.3 = δn + εn, where εn is the mean of the mea-
surement errors.
However, neither true-score theory nor SEM analyses
based on relevant latent variables restricts the range of mea-
surement error (from −102 mm to +102 mm). Thus, we
cannot deduce from the premise of CTT decomposition, the
nice feature of essential tau-equivalence of same-sign dif-
ference score variables, or the data at hand, that the true-
score difference δn is strictly positive, as we cannot exclude
the possibility that εn < −10 mm, for example. The argu-
ment of logical invalidity due to unrestricted measurement
error is detailed in Vautier, Lacot, and Veldhuis (2014) and
Vautier, Veldhuis, Lacot, and Matton (2012). SEM testing of
the structural properties of statistical moments (i.e., means,
variances, and covariances) tells us nothing about individual
measurement errors. Consequently, even if psychologists re-
alize that true scores are not measurements of tense arousal,
and focus their reasoning on true distances and the differ-
ences between these true distances, they cannot exclude the
possibility that 9.3 is compatible with a negative associated
true-distance difference. In practice, they ignore the sign of
the associated true-distance difference.
The Vectorial Approach
Turning to the proposed alternative, we adopt a fal-
sificationist methodology in order to learn hypothetico-
deductively from respondents’ longitudinal data, and we rely
on a simple definition of scientific measurement. First of all,
we reject the definition of measurement as mere rule-based
numerical encoding, which obfuscates the concepts of nat-
ural law and social norm (Popper, 2013).1 Measurability is
not a matter of convention but a matter of fact. Furthermore,
if, like Michell and others (e.g., McGrane, 2015; Petocz &
Newberry, 2010), we prefer to restrict the definition of sci-
entific measurement to metrical measurement, that is, to the
idea that measurement as a process results in a real-valued
proportion of a measurement unit (or, more accurately, in
an interval surrounding that proportion), then clearly nobody
has yet discovered a measurement process that would enable
us to find a ratio of a tense arousal unit. In short, we can-
not scientifically assert that marks on VASs measure tense
arousal.
There is room, nonetheless, for a scientific view of ordi-
nal measurement – not to be confused with Stevens’ (1946)
1 "The making of a decision, the adoption of a norm or of a stan-
dard, is a fact. But the norm or the standard which has been adopted,
is not a fact. That most people agree with the norm ‘Thou shalt not
steal’ is a sociological fact. But the norm ‘Thou shalt not steal’
is not a fact, and can never be inferred from sentences describing
facts." (p. 61)
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notion of an ordinal scale –, based on the idea that a quan-
tity can be measured ordinally by some observable events if
– and only if – there is a monotone function that is defined
in the domain of the quantity and takes its values from the
codomain of these observable events (a necessary but not suf-
ficient condition for metrical measurement). Sherry (2011)
distinguishes between thermoscopes (ordinal measurement)
and thermometers (metrical measurement; see also Chang,
2004), and, as we will see, the existence of a multivariate
function can be an empirical issue: some auxiliary hypothe-
ses enable us to test the notion that marks on two VASs are
ordinal measurements of the same quantity (for a similar ap-
proach to item responses expressed in a discrete format, see
Lacot, Afzali, & Vautier, 2015; Vautier, 2015). The first sub-
section below contains the necessary definitions and nota-
tions. The second subsection sets out the overall hypothesis
that marks on a series of VASs designed to measure the same
amount of tense arousal are ordinal measurements. The third
subsection discusses the testing of this hypothesis.
The Measurement Function of Respondents’ Rat-
ings on a Given VAS
Existence of an amount of tense arousal at any time in a
respondent’s life. First of all, for a mark on a VAS to be a
measurement of tense arousal, it must be the measurement
of an amount of something, that is, we must assume that an
amount of tense arousal does exist. This hypothesis can be
stated formally as the hypothesis of a function Q that links
any time point in the respondent’s life to one and only one
amount of tense arousal, which can vary from zero tense
arousal to a maximum amount of tense arousal.
Q : Ω→ [0, max]
t 7→ Q(t) = q (3)
We assume that [0, max] is a continuous segment of amounts
of tense arousal.
Ordinal measurability. In order to assume that an amount
of tense arousal in a given individual is ordinally measurable
by marks made by that person on a VAS, say VAS i, we must
assume the existence of the measurement function
Fi : [0, max]→ [0 mm, 102 mm]
q 7→ Fi(q) = yi. (4)
Let us assume that a negative VAS (i.e., i = 1, 2, 3, Fi)
broadly increases, that is:
∀(q, q′) ∈ [0, max]2, q > q′ ⇒ Fi(q) ≥ Fi(q′). (5)
Let us also assume that a positive VAS (i.e., i = 4, 5, 6, Fi)
broadly decreases, that is:
∀(q, q′) ∈ [0, max]2, q > q′ ⇒ Fi(q) ≤ Fi(q′). (6)
First auxiliary hypothesis due to temporal approximation.
The time it takes to collect a rating on VAS i is an interval
[t0, t1] such that t1 − t0 > 0 s, where t0 and t1 denote the
beginning and end of the rating task. We will assume that
changes in tense arousal within this interval can be ignored.
∀ t ∈ [t0, t1], Q(t) = q. (7)
Hereafter, t denotes a moment, that is, a short time interval,
and the auxiliary hypothesis (7) is assumed.
The respondent’s rating on VAS i at t viewed as an ordinal
measurement of an amount of tense arousal. To interpret the
respondent’s mark on a VAS i as a measurement, we need to
compose the functions Q and Fi as follows:
yi = (Fi ◦ Q)(t) = Fi[Q(t)] = Fi(q). (8)
Measurement Function of Respondents’ Ratings
on the Six VASs
Let the vector (or 6-tuple) y = (y1, y2, . . . , y6) denote
the results of the measurements performed with VASs 1, 2,
. . . , 6, through the functions F1, F2, . . . , F6, at t1, t2, . . . , t6.
Thus,
y = [(F1 ◦ Q)(t1), (F2 ◦ Q)(t2), . . . , (F6 ◦ Q)(t6)]. (9)
A second auxiliary hypothesis that a testable property of
vectors observed in a longitudinal individual design can be
derived. The overall hypothesis is that the vectors of marks
resulting from ratings made by a respondent during a given
assessment can be tested if one assumes that the amount of
tense arousal varies across a limited range between t1 and t6.
Let us formulate the extreme assumption of no change, as
follows (this assumption is slightly relaxed below):
Q(t1) = Q(t2) = · · · = Q(t6) = q. (10)
Accordingly,
y = [F1(q), F2(q), . . . , F6(q)], (11)
and the multivariate ordinal measurement function is
F = F1F2 . . . F6 : [0, max]→ [0 mm, 102 mm]6
q 7→ F(q) = y = (y1, y2, . . . , y6). (12)
Deducing the comparability of two vectors. Let us as-
sume that Respondent 1 rated her/his mood twice, and that
q and q′ were the amounts of tense arousal at the first and
second assessments . If q = q′, then y = y′. If q < q′,
then Fi(q) ≤ Fi(q′) for i = 1, 2, 3, and Fi(q) ≥ Fi(q′) for
i = 4, 5, 6. If q > q′, then Fi(q) ≥ Fi(q′) for i = 1, 2, 3, and
Fi(q) ≤ Fi(q′) for i = 4, 5, 6. We will call these structural
constraints on y and y′ the property of comparability.
Conversely, the vectors y and y′ will be incomparable if
two VASs of the same sign exhibit changes in opposite di-
rections, or if two VASs of opposite signs exhibit changes
in the same direction. For example, coming back to Re-
spondent 1’s vectors y = (24, 50, 58, 54, 71, 78), and
y′ = (66, 34, 60, 70, 62, 62), we can see that VAS 1 ex-
hibits an increase from 24 mm to 66 mm, while VAS 2 ex-
hibits a decrease from 50 mm to 34 mm. Thus, y and y′ are
incomparable.
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Testing that Two Observed Vectors are Ordinal
Measurements
If y and y′ are incomparable, we are led to conclude that
the amount of tense arousal increased and decreased. The
auxiliary hypothesis (10) is used here to render such a con-
clusion absurd: either the amount remains constant, or it
changes, in which case either it increases or it decreases.
This hypothesis (11) is testable because it precludes the oc-
currence of incomparable observed vectors.
However, it can be argued that the observed vectors are
not necessarily true. For example, Fi(q) is defined as a point
between 0 mm and 102 mm but the mark on VAS i is not a
point. Consequently, there is no exact description of Fi(q).
We would reply that Fi(q) simply needs to be surrounded, us-
ing an interval of approximation, in such a way that we can
always decide what counts as a true change between Fi(q)
and Fi(q′). We can decide not to accept the observation of
a true change between yi and y′i if |yi − y′i | < s, where s is
a convenient – conventional – threshold. The choice of s
also means that we do not have to assume that the auxiliary
hypothesis (10), according to which q is invariant during the
rating task, holds perfectly. For example, we need to take
s ≥ 17 mm – that is, the convention of an approximation
interval of at least ±8.5 mm – to save the contention that
the overall measurement hypothesis holds for Respondent 1.
With this convention, only VAS 1 (tense) allows us to detect
an increase in tense arousal, as the vector of the observed
differences can be written as follows:
y′ − y = (+42, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0), (13)
where the value 0 means that the differences are neglected if
the approximation intervals for each mark (s/2 = ±8.5 mm)
overlap.
Were we to take s = 10 mm as a reasonable value for
the approximation interval of any mark, the vector of the ob-
served differences would be
y′ − y = (+42, −16, 0, +16, 0, −16), (14)
thus falsifying the hypothesis. Consequently, psychologists
cannot use these ratings as multivariate ordinal measure-
ments of tense arousal, and must take this scientific knowl-
edge into account when interpreting the data.
Conclusion
Psychologists wanting to assess how a patient’s tense
arousal has changed, using her/his test-retest ratings on a
series of three negative and three positive VASs, may adopt
CTT to compute one composite difference score based on the
negative ratings, and one composite difference score based
on the positive ratings. However, if they do so, they face two
problems: (1) they have to believe that the true-score differ-
ence associated with the first composite difference measures
a change in tense arousal, in which case they ignore what
happens to the second composite difference measure, and (2)
they cannot deduce the sign of the true-score difference be-
cause the measurement error is not usefully restricted (mea-
surement error ranging from −102 mm to +102 mm), even
if previous studies have reported good reliability estimates
based on nice structural properties (e.g., Vautier, 2011). Al-
though traditional SEM studies based on CTT may support
structural hypotheses about multivariate moments, they are
not designed to document the use of data in individual as-
sessment settings.
Psychologists need to think about what measurement
means in the practical setting that concerns them. We de-
veloped a causal view, according to which for an observed
event to be a measurement, it has to result from a causal pro-
cess that links the amount of something to be measured to
this event through a measurement function (see also Lacot et
al., 2015). From this theoretical perspective, respondents are
viewed as responding systems that have no choice in the way
they behave: the marks on the six VASs depend functionally
on their amount of tense arousal – just as the height of the
mercury in a thermometer depends on the amount of tem-
perature (all other relevant causal parameters being equal).
One immediate objection to this view is that respondents are
not systems but people: one main difference between sys-
tems and people is that the latter respond to the rating task
according to their intention to put marks on the VASs. This
means that psychologists must be aware of the fact that the
assessment occasion is a conversational setting. A person
cannot be a measurement instrument, since a measurement
instrument (e.g., a thermometer) has no intentionality and no
sense of behaving in a conversational setting.
Psychologists may therefore ask whether patients’ ratings
have properties that would be expected from a measurement
instrument incorporating a multivariate measurement func-
tion F as defined above (12), thus allowing their observations
to be used for assessment purposes. For example, Respon-
dent 74 in Vautier’s (2011) study produced the ratings y =
(40, 36, 36, 36, 39, 28) and y′ = (16, 5, 13, 68, 64, 53),
yielding the differences
y′ − y = (−24, −31, −24, +32, +25, +25), (15)
thus corroborating the multivariate ordinal measurement hy-
pothesis. Psychologists could therefore deduce from the
measurement hypothesis and the data that this patient’s tense
arousal decreased. Importantly, the measurement hypothe-
sis cannot be blindly generalized to any respondent, as it is
in item response theory (e.g., Embretson & Reise, 2000), as
each respondent has to be thought of as a specific rating sys-
tem with a specific function F.
If their observations falsify the measurement hypothesis,
as they did for 21.6% of Vautier’s (2011) selected cases with
s = 10 mm, psychologists must investigate the potential
meaning of patients’ ratings from the point of view of the
patients themselves, instead of the point of view of an un-
tenable measurement hypothesis. For example, Respondent
1 could be asked if he intended to say that he felt more tense
(from 24 to 66 mm) and less strained (from 50 to 34 mm),
and, if the answer was "yes", what he wanted to say.
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